

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00

OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 AECE-00 /079 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0718

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0478

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SPC DRAFT GUIDANCE ON EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL

REF: A) USNATO 6775; B) MBFR VIENNA 0475

1. WE CONTINUE TO THINK IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR ALLIES TO AGREE OR TO IMPLY AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST ON A FORCE FREEZE.

2. A FORCE FREEZE WOULD MEAN ACCEPTING CONTROLS ON NATO FORCES WITHOUT REQUIRING EASTERN REDUCTIONS. AGREEMENT ON A FREEZE WOULD GIVE THE EAST WHAT IT WANTS IN THIS REGARD AND CORRESPONDINGLY DECREASE WESTERN LEVERAGE IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS.

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3. WE BELIEVE SOVIETS GENUINELY DESIRE A FREEZE AND

WILL PUT A LOT OF STEAM BEHIND IT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN WESTERN ACCEPTANCE.

4. ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A FORCE FREEZE IN 1975 WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERS TO SHOW PROGRESS IN 1975 IN MILITARY DETENTE TO COMPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE.

5. IF THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEIR PROGRAM THROUGH A FREEZE AGREEMENT WITH THE WEST, THEY WILL NO LONGER BE UNDER ANY PRESSURE TO REACH SPECIFIC REDUCTION RESULTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE PENDING CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES OR THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS.

6. THE SOVIETS WOULD THEN HAVE TIME TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTIONS. WE WOULD NOT.

7. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, THE SOVIETS WILL FOLLOW-UP ON ANY ALLIED INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON A FREEZE PROPOSAL AND MIGHT EVEN MAKE CONCESSIONS TO MEET ALLIED INTERESTS IN THIS REGARD.

8. THEY ALSO MIGHT BE QUITE UNWILLING TO TURN TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS UNTIL A FREEZE HAD BEEN AGREED ON.

9. IF THE ALLIES HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE ON A FREEZE, THE SOVIETS COULD INSIST THAT WORK ON A FREEZE BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO TURNING TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTIONS.

10. FOR THESE REASONS, WE THINK IT ADVISABLE TO AVOID ANY WESTERN COMMITMENT DIRECT OR IMPLICIT TO NEGOTIATE ON A FREEZE, INCLUDING MAKING A COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON A FREEZE.

11. IN DISCUSSION DECEMBER 5 WITH UK SECRETARY OF STATE HATTERSLEY, WE POINTED OUT INTRINSIC DIFFICULTIES OF A FREEZE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. THESE POINTS SEEMED
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TO MAKE SOME IMPRESSION ON HATTERSLEY. LATTER SAID HIS MAIN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENT WAS NOT TO TREAT THE IDEA OF A FORCE FREEZE AS SUCH IN A NEGATIVE WAY. THEREFORE, HE WAS NOT WILLING TO REJECT IDEA OF FREEZE AS SUCH. BUT HE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK IT ESSENTIAL TO MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS THAT THE WEST EITHER MAKE COUNTER-PROPOSAL OR COMMIT ITSELF TO NEGOTIATE ON A FREEZE. MAINLY, HE DID NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OF SAYING

THAT A FREEZE WAS A BAD THING.

12. IT CONTINUES ESSENTIAL, IN OUR VIEW, FOR THE ALLIES TO REACH AN AGREED POSITION ON THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL PRIOR TO THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION ON DECEMBER 10 OR AT THE VERY LATEST IN TIME FOR LAST PLENARY ON DECEMBER 11. IF THE SPC HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REACHING AN AGREED TEXT SATISFACTORY TO THE USG BY END OF DAY ON DECEMBER 6, AND ONLY IF NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE ALLIED AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MEET THE TYPE OF REQUIREMENT DESCRIBED BY HATTERSLEY WITHOUT THE ALLIES UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON THE SOVIET FREEZE PROPOSAL. USING THE SPC TEXT IN REF (A) AS A BASE, ONE COULD SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FIRST PARAGRAPH THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE TEXT:

BEGIN TEXT:

AS REGARDS THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL OF A NON-INCREASE DECLARATION APPLYING TO THE NUMERICAL STRENGTHS OF MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ON A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT ARE IN PROGRESS, THE ALLIES CONSIDER THAT, IN THE ABSTRACT, THE IDEA OF A MANPOWER FREEZE HAS POSITIVE ASPECTS. HOWEVER, THEY SEE THE FOLLOWING NEGATIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PROPOSAL OF THE WARSAW PACT: END TEXT.

13. THERE WOULD FOLLOW FIRST THREE TICS OF REF (A) WITH THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED IN MBFR VIENNA 0475

14. THE SECOND TO LAST PARAGRAPH OF REF (A) TEXT WOULD BE ELIMINATED. IF NECESSARY FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT, IT COULD BE REPLACED WITH THE STATEMENT: BEGIN
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QUOTE: THE ALLIES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN CONSIDERED WARSAW PACT REACTIONS TO THESE COMMENDS. END QUOTE.

15. THIS APPROACH WOULD ENABLE ALLIED OFFICIALS TO INFORM WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION ALONG LINES OF WHAT THEY HAD SAID TO THE EAST. THE RESPONSE WOULD ENABLE THEM TO AVOID THE ONUS OF NEGATIVISM ON FORCE FREEZE WHILE PUTTING BEFORE THE WESTERN PUBLIC THE REASONS WHY THE ALLIES DID NOT LIKE THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. THE CHRISTMAS BREAK WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO ASSESS PUBLIC OPINION REACTION AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY HAVE TO GO FURTHER AND MAKE AN ACTUAL COUNTER-PROPOSAL. THIS WESTERN POSITION WOULD ALSO PRESUMABLY REQUIRE EAST TO LEAD OFF WITH POSITIVE AMENDMENTS OF THEIR PROPOSAL PRIOR TO ANY

ALLIED AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON IT.

16. WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THESE
COMMENTS IN PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO USNATO.RESOR

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